Amistad

Note: This article first appeared in Stud.Jur nr. 5, 2011.

Exposition
            The year is 1840, and we are to be found in the United States of America. The Civil War is 20 years in the future, peanut butter has not yet been invented and some forty slaves of unknown origin are fighting for their freedom in American courts.
            The slaves were brought to the American coastline on the Spanish ship La Amistad. One of the them broke free from his chains and managed to liberate his compatriots. In the following mutiny, the slaves managed to take over the ship; with the loss of the cook, the captain and a few of the slaves. After having been tricked by the surviving Spaniards, they brought the ship to the coast of Long Island, where they were discovered and caught by the American cutter, USCR Washington.
            The following case was complicated and comprised of no less than five different parties, which included the Kingdom of Spain, the surviving Spaniards, the captain and some of the crew Washington and the State of Connecticut (where the case was made) - in addition to the slaves themselves. In a welter of accusations and falsified evidence, and tension between anti- and pro-slavery movements, the slaves were able to win their freedom. But, alas, the President at the time, Martin Van Buren, appealed the case directly to the federal Supreme Court - in fear of the symbolic value the case had acquired.

Brief
            The film is directed by Steven Spielberg - and that is easy to see! When it comes to the production itself, there is little to complain about. It is well filmed and put together nicely. The music is well chosen, and the dialogues are well written and performed by well-trained and capable actors, which includes amongst others Morgan Freeman, Matthew McConaughey and Anthony Hopkins.
            Unfortunately, there are certain elements that pull it a few notches. As in almost every Hollywoodian film "based on true events", the director takes several artistic liberties. This would normally be all-right, but when the proceedings are portrayed as one of the main causes of the American Civil War - two decades before it happened - it gets more than any reviewer with a shred of self-respect can handle. In addition to this, there is little focus on the actual legal disputes (which are quite exceptional), and the procedure itself boils down to an overly pompous game of rhetoric. For an aspiring student of law, this is gets quite difficult to swallow.

Ruling
            The result is good, but could have been much better. A big plus for Anthony Hopkins' inspiring performance. Four out of six stars.

Stud.Jur

I am currently studying law in Oslo, Norway. There, I have joined the writing crew of Stud.Jur, the periodical of Oslo's law students. Up until now, I have written five articles for the magazine, and I will translate as many of the relevant ones as possible and put them here. Warning: I will try to translate as accurately as possible but, as much as I would like to think otherwise, I am merely human. Thou be'st warned!

First up will be a film-review I wrote about Amistad, the Steven Spielberg film from 1997. It will be published on the 30th of October, at exactly 08:37 AM (UTC+01).

On Faith – Part III, a) The Cosmological Argument, or Why I Went from Deism to Agnosticism

                The essence of the argument is fairly simple and might easily be summed up as this:

-          Question: Why is there something rather than nothing?

-          Answer: God.

I must admit it has a certain elegance to it when put in this form; it has certainly been popular. The first (known) versions of the argument seem to have been formulated in antiquity Greece, by Plato and Aristotle. Plato, in what I'd almost characterise as a very modern scientific way of looking at it, argues that all motion in the universe has had to come from somewhere, from a “self-originated motion”. Aristotle also defended the existence of a ‘first-mover’, which he called the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον (better known as primus motor in Latin), but he defined it as an essence of pure thought, somehow organising cosmos by “being itself the object of ‘aspiration and desire’” (source: Wikipedia). Now, it can be contradictory for them to speak of a first cause, as they were both conform with antiquity thought that the Cosmos always had existed and always would. They both simply acknowledged that something had to be behind it.


                There are many versions of the argument. Just to name a few adherents of “modern” times, both Gottfried Leibniz and Thomas Aquinas have had their own versions, the latter one the most influential. In Thomas Aquinas’ Quinque Viae (lat. = Five ways), a book depicting five arguments meant to “prove” God’s existence, his cosmological argument is the first of the five. No matter the version, they can all (globally) be placed in one of the three following categories: Argument from contingency, in fieri and in esse.

The Argument from Contingency: First of all, contingency means possibility - something that might or might not happen. In this context, it refers to the fact that something might or might not exist. I like to explain this with a bowl of apples. Either there is apples in it, or, in the case where the bowl would be empty, there is not. Now, for it to be apples in it there must be some kind of an external force that can put them there, let us call him Bob. But even Bob must have found them somewhere – the apples must have grown on an apple tree, which again must have an origin. Now we could keep going on like this for a while, talking about apple seeds, earth, the sun and possibly even evolution, but all of these are contingent in essence; they could not have existed at all. A modern scientist will prolong this chain of causality all the way to the Big Bang, but will not scientifically be able to go any further. But as nothing can be created out of nothing, the Universe itself must also have a cause, and to avoid a causational chain of infinite regression, the chain must end somewhere with something, or someone for that matter, that is necessarily (≠contingently) existent – something that is and could not not have been. According to Thomas Aquinas, we have found our God.

In Fieri: Basically “in becoming”. This version of the Cosmological Argument states only that a first cause, a creator, is necessary for the universe to have been created. Let us say that Bob makes a boat. Afterwards, Bob may die. Or just go on to do something else. The boat will continue to exist regardless of further intervention from Bob (occasional maintenance might be in order, but alas! it is not a perfect metaphor).  Even if we were to acknowledge a certain validity to the Cosmological Argument - that it proves, or at least suggests, the existence of a divine architect, that does not imply that he is still around, or if he is, that he cares about mortal affairs (again, I would evoke the Dervish from Candide, as referenced in On Faith - Part I). Though Bob might have created the boat, he might as well have gotten tired of it afterwards, preferring to work on other projects.

In Esse: Means “in existence”. While in fiery is not dependent on its maker for its continued existence, this version is like the water in a bucket, which is only able to keep its form as long as the bucket is in place. It closely resembles the God-model of Spinoza, who saw God as a part of nature, of everything around us – inseparable from the rest of the universe. Not much more to it than that.

                Though quite persuasive, the Cosmological argument, along with all divine arguments, presents several weaknesses:

                First of all, the argument, if valid, suggests at best no more than a creator cause. It can in no way be used to prove the existence of any particular god and the capabilities usually associated with it, such as omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. Neither does it support the notion of a “cosmic intelligence” or even conscious being. You could of course take the rhetorical route and just call the cosmic entity which started it all, or whatever a first cause would be, god, but it would be nothing more than a pernicious way of bending  the argument, easy to use to defend one’s own notion of god.
                Philosophers have pointed out logical fallacies within the argument, amongst whom David Hume seems to have been particularly productive. Hume points out that extrapolating a primus motor solves nothing, as it creates an even bigger question than that which it answers: who or what caused the First Cause? His problem of induction would also be applicable in this case: causal relation is never a priori true. It can only be deduced a posterior, in hindsight. To use science as an example, science can never be proven objectively, only disproven. Scientific theories are models which we use to explain and predict the world around us, and they are only valid until we discover a flaw and are able to correct, replace or refute them. I can personally postulate that Hollywood does not exist, as I have never seen it for myself. Of course, I have a slight suspicion that if I ever go there, then I might be able to find those indiscrete letters and the city district that comes with it, but until I so do, I can never know for sure. It is the same with causality: We have never observed a situation where it has not seemed to be the case, supposed miracles besides, and we can only assume that it is an eternal, universal law. And as to how it works outside of or before the beginning of the universe, who knows? We have never had the opportunity to see for ourselves.

                Another problem is that it supposes that there has to be a first cause. By summing up the arguments of David Hume and Paul Edwards, William L. Rowe formulates what he calls the Hume-Edwards principle:

“If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is hereby explained.” 

Rowe himself did not agree with it, but is rather persuasive, as we certainly have no less reason to postulate an infinite causal chain than to postulate a supposed first cause. Theologians might argue (and indeed they have) that God is somehow self-caused or that it has always have been in existence. But even if we allow self-causation (or eternal existence), why can it not be the Universe itself that is self-caused (or always in existence)? Even if the Cosmological Argument were valid, God would be independent of it, and rather redundant. And this is what shook the foundation of my Deism. We have in the end no rational reason to believe that there is a creator god, a Grand Architect. The God of the Philosophers have been refuted by the very same rationality that spawned it.

"They say that God is everywhere, and yet we always think of Him as somewhat of a recluse." Emily Dickinson

Ps. Cartoon was taken from Chaospet. If the author ever reads this: hope you do not mind!(Awesome cartoon, by the way)

Waiting for Faith: On the Obligations of the Royal

Editor's notes: I know this is getting ridiculous; this will be the last waiting for. I am currently working on the next "On Faith" article, which will, if not terminate the series, at least accomplish my original goal.

               It has recently been brought to my attention that the Norwegian king is actually obliged by law to be a proclaimed Christian (Lutheran). I already knew that he along with the rest of the Royal Family are the only ones not allowed to have any official political opinion, a notion I support, yet this seems particularly cruel and totalitarian. The law against any voiced political opinion, which include a conduct which does not suggest partiality, is necessary to keep the Royals above political meddling. I will not discuss why I, and Norway as well, deem that necessary. This, however, is as said, only laws concerning conduct. The king can, of course think whatever he likes, as law cannot limit thought. But is this not exactly what it is doing with a law obliging Christian adherence? The ones that made me aware of this law states that as the king represents Norway, a Christian country with Christian traditions, it is only natural that he himself is Christian. They also point to that is is in no way forced to any religion. He adhere to whatever religion he likes, but only if he abdicates the throne. But in what way is that a real choice? But I do not mean do digress to far away from my main point. Even considering that the king is a representative for a Christian Norway, I do not believe that any law should be able to force a certain philosophical or religious opinion on anyone. One might argue that he only has to be Lutheran officially, but I will not myself defend such a preposterous and blasphemous notion.
               I feel the need to specify that I am of course not against having a Christian king,  nor a Muslim one for that matter, only against any law obliging adherence. No one's mind should be subjected to law, not even the king's. As an analogy, racism is not outlawed - only acting upon it is.


"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief" extract from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18

Waiting for Faith: A Propos Pascal's Wager

          When I was searching for a diagram to illustrate Pascal's Wager, a lot of unexpected, and most welcome! results turned up. I enjoyed myself a lot and would like to share that (some of the pictures are small, so just click on them to get a better view). With my two or three readers......... Sources will be given in the post scriptum.

I do like this one, though it does not really capture the essence of my critique of the Wager. As I've already said, I do not believe that God rewards cynical faith-based calculations. And which God should one gamble on anyway? Which brings us to the next one:

As the lady says, something Blaise (Pascal) overlooked, how to know which God to gamble on? There are literally thousands of different religious views out there, so how does one now which one is correct? Christianity wasn't even the first major religion; one might as well believe in Greek or Norse mythology (or in the Flying Spaghetti Monster! though that one is contemporary)! I do love the way Richard Dawkins arguments. But now, let's look at some motivational posters:

Whomever made the one to the left, and for that matter the one to the right, is right (and hello confusing sentence!): It is inspiring! Oh! and I love the way I can now reread some cartoons and understanding the pretty deep and smart reference to the Gambit. Calvin and Hobbes, and XKCD ftW(!):

I also found some that might seem a bit offensive to Christians (and atheists, for that matter). I will let the curious search out the most offensive for themselves, though I do believe these two seem innocent enough:

And then a little bit of good-old criticism of bigotry:

And I simply adore this one ("Publie, je ne le hais point!"):

Myth busted! I will terminate this article with what I believe is what Pascal's Wager should have been, if Blaise had been better versed in religious views. It is really brilliantly thought of, and though it is amusing, it should also be lauded for its verity. I realise now that I should have included this in my previous article:

Ps. My sources cited chronologically:

1. http://www.freethoughtpedia.com/wiki/Pascal's_Wager
2. http://www.whydontyou.org.uk/blog/2008/09/25/pascals-wager-in-cartoon-terms/
3. http://thethinkable.com/home.php/2009/01/27/gambling-with-god
4. http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/okay-athiest-wouldnt-you-rather-live-a-good-life-doing-what-god-says-to-do-and-believe-in-him-and/question-535535/?page=4
5. http://unreasonablefaith.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/ch090204.gif
6. http://xkcd.com/525/
7. http://www.smbc-comics.com/
8. http://fleasnobbery.blogspot.com/2009/02/pascals-wager.html
9. http://www.thadguy.com/comic/godless-atheists/251/
10. http://abstrusegoose.com/258
11.  http://thechaoscosmos.com/

On Faith - Part II: On the Path from Deism to Agnosticism

Notes by editor: I've realised that this project has become much too big, so I have decided to divide “On Faith - Part II” into several parts. As it is mostly due to the immensity of my own musings upon the subject, it will take over the place as Part II, while the individual arguments treated in “On Faith - Part I,584something” will get their own posts as Part III a), b) et cetera. I believe it will also be easier on the eye, and thus mind, this way, so we all win, no?

            Can God’s existence be proven? This simple question is in fact the opposite (which makes this sentence acquire the literary stature of an ‘antithesis’). Philosophers have tried to answer this since, well, for a heck of a long time. Some believe themselves to have been more successful than others, but in the end, also their arguments have been ripped to shreds. For the pious, the bad news is that that there is no rational evidence to support the existence of God. The good news is that there is no evidence to the contrary either, though some might argue that there are rationales that might suggest, if maybe not prove, that some religions might at least be mislead. Nevertheless, I will address some of the more common arguments and try show why, at least in my opinion, though I am seconded by, among others, philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, it is irrational to have any religious view at all (pictures of my homies respectively to North-East and South-East).

Before I go on, I would like to clarify what I mean by claiming religion to be irrational. Faith is by its very nature against reason, as no god’s existence can be proven. In fact, if it could, there would no longer be any need to believe in God, Jesus, or anything at all - all that would be needed was to acknowledge its existence. So much for: “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:29). In this, I fully agree with the wisdom of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialistic philosopher that I have, though I only know a little of him, acquired a lot of respect for:

“If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe.”

Pay heed to his words, for he might be one of the greatest Christian philosophers of our time. 
I have often asked myself what I would acknowledge as being a reasonable principal to found one’s belief. The question might seem paradoxical - I have just argued that belief is irrational, but what I mean by reasonable is some sort of justification as to why believe. If there are none, what would then be the difference between faith and mere gullibility? What would then be the difference between believing in God and believing in UFOs? There is no rational argument for either of them; logically, there is no difference. No, whether irrational or not, belief cannot be unjustified. But from whence should such a justification come? What could act as a proper foundation? I myself am not able to believe because I personally do not have any answer to this question. Ironically, I seem to take this question more seriously than the believers themselves, and that is perhaps also why I am not one of them. Most believers, just as me a few years ago, have grown up with the influence of their religion. I sometimes find it amusing to ask believers if they would, hypothetically, have had a different belief if they had grown up with the influence of another religion, and they unanimously accept that it might be so. And that is also a great problem as I see it. If one would have believed differently by being raised under other circumstances, it all boils down to habit. Is it not an outrage towards God that all that supports your faith in it is that you are used to that belief? And if God indeed demands and encourages blind faith, then he is no better than a tyrant, and thus not worthy, almighty or not, of our subjection. The acclaimed Omnibenevolence of the Christian God, par exemple, does not seem to be worth much.
                The only justification I have come to accept as a reasonable justification, to the extent that is possible in this, is adherence to the philosophy of the religion in question. I do not myself find it necessary to subscribe to Christianity to respect and agree with the values of Christ (I would be the first to sign up for that), but others might. Others do, in fact, as the argument is not by me. Otherwise, some justify their adherence by the fact that they “feel content and right” in their belief, and take that as a sign that they are on the right path. I believe it only comes from the comfort of believing in afterlife and the other advantageous quirks of religion, which I will discuss further on, but I cannot really argue against it. How do you argue against revelations and epiphanies, or whatever it is, other than trying to make them question their sanity?
                In theological philosophy, there is something called “Pascal’s Wager”, so named because it was the French philosopher Blaise Pascal that first thought of it. The idea is simple. If in doubt about God’s existence, the best thing to do is just to “wager” upon its existence. If you do believe in him, and are proven wrong, you lose nothing, but if he indeed does exist, you gain eternal life and bliss. If you do not believe in him, and are proven right, you gain nothing at all, but, if we in the end are wrong, we risk eternal damnation at worst, either way loosing eternal bliss. I cannot for a second believe that any good, as opposed to evil, God would accept such cold-hearted calculations. We are asked to believe, not to go with what seems to give the best possible outcome. In fact, I am more inclined to believe that God rewards any honest attempt of reasoning, and punishes any feigned or blind faith. I fully agree with Richard Carrier’s argument  against the gambit of Pascal (though I have only included the extract provided by Wikipedia, I fully recommend following the link and reading the complete version, believer or not):

“Suppose there is a God who is watching us and choosing which souls of the deceased to bring to heaven, and this god really does want only the morally good to populate heaven. He will probably select from only those who made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth. For all others are untrustworthy, being cognitively or morally inferior, or both. They will also be less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong. That is, if they have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong, it follows necessarily that they must have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong. Since this knowledge requires knowledge about many fundamental facts of the universe (such as whether there is a god), it follows necessarily that such people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct. Therefore, only such people can be sufficiently moral and trustworthy to deserve a place in heaven — unless God wishes to fill heaven with the morally lazy, irresponsible, or untrustworthy.”

Even though I am content by having no religious inclination, I must say that I do envy believers to some extent. I once asked a mother why she insisted on raising her children to believe in God when she knew that she was thus depriving them of a true choice in the matter. What she answered was that she wanted her children to grow up knowing that whatever they experienced, wherever they were, they would always know that there was someone(/thing) who would watch over them. She wanted to provide them with a sense of security. I cannot argue against that, nor do I want to, because it is indeed a beautiful thought. I should know: I too grew up with it. It also gives a sense of comfort, somewhat relieving the existential anxiety, to know that there is a life after death, were the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished, and were we can meet again those we have lost - to know that we will not be lost. But though I am envious of all this, though I want all this, I cannot accept that that in itself is a good enough reason to adhere to it. Humans have always feared death; it is not a good enough reason to believe in any sort of deity. And it certainly does not prove or justify anything. In fact, many sociologists argue that that is all religion is: an attempt to quell and satisfy our fears and hopes. All agree that the gods of ancient mythology, be that Greek or Norse, are the people of their time’s attempt to explain and justify natural phenomena. Thus Thor and Zeus became gods of lightning, Freyja and Aphrodite the goddesses of love and beauty, and I especially like the mythology around Eros, explaining that we fall in love by being shot by arrows. But mythology is no more than outdated and unfashionable religion, and in what way is modern religion any less “mythological”?

But we should get back to my original point. Throughout the ages, philosophers and theologists have presented different sorts of logical “proofs” of God’s, or several gods’, existence. Saint Thomas Aquinas have his argument of (in)finite regress, Descartes has his ontological argument, et cetera. Many of these have existed under several different versions throughout the ages, and, though they have all been dis-proven, they keep coming back, as many of them have a certain perennial appeal. All of the different arguments I will aboard are present in my notes from “50 Philosophical Ideas you really Need to Know”, but this time I will try to thoroughly describe and explain the ideas. I will start with the most obvious one, the one often used to justify deism (I did so myself until I read and reflected upon the chapter concerned): The Cosmological argument. Look it up in “Faith – Part III a) The Cosmological Argument”. Coming soon

“If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation, that He exists”, Blaise Pascal

Waiting for Faith: On Arpeggios

          I never thought I would post something where I'd excuse myself for not posting more often - so I won't. I do, however, feel the need to explain that, though I try to write something every two weeks, there has been a hiatus due to the fact that the PC on which I wrote the draft for "Faith - Part II" went 'bye-bye'. I have not been able to access it for around two weeks, but I can now, so the next post will be published in a few days.

          While I have your attention, I feel the need to remark that, as a pianist, I really abhor arpeggios. They sound nice, but they are really difficult to master, and they are everywhere. They exist in a million variations too, so one has to learn them all over. Every. Single. Time. I thought I had had the worst of it, but that was until I decide to partake "Lugia's Song", a really beautiful piece from the second Pokémon movie. They seem simple enough, but they are divinely awful to play.
          I might exaggerate, but I do not like, to learn, arpeggios. I will master these too eventually, but in the meantime, they are my worst enemy.

On Faith - Part I,584something

         As a preparation for my oncoming article "On Faith - Part II", I have decided to post my notes on the chapters concerning religion from an amazing book I just read. For a very good résumé of the panorama of ideas that make up western philosophy, "50 Philosophy Ideas You really Need to Know" is the book to look for. In the chapters concerned, the authors introduce and explain the different philosophical arguments meant to prove God's existence, for then to explain end interpret the responses and counter-arguments of philosophers. To sum up concisely, God's existence can neither be proven nor dis-proven. To sum up not quite as quickly, my notes concerning these chapters, plus some of my own additions, can be found further down:

Religion

38, The Argument from Design (the divine watchmaker) 

- The argument form design, also known as the theological argument, is the belief that we can induce from the complexity of natural mechanisms that there is a creator behind it all. But there are several weak points in this theory, first pointed out by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779):

o   Arguments from analogy works best when the different ‘objects’ are not too different. We can infer from our anatomical resemblance with the chimpanzees that they might feel pain as we do, but to compare an eye with a camera is to go a bit far, as is to compare a watch with the mechanisms of the universe

o   The argument is vulnerable to infinite regress. If our universe needs a designer, than what can we say about the universe and its designer? Do we need and über-designer? And then an über-über-designer, etc.?

o   The arguments biggest appeal is that it explains the complexity and marvel with what things like the human eye works and comes to existence. But the theory of evolution does the same thing, without the need of an omnipotent creator.

o   Even if we recognise in the argument, there are limits to it. Certain aspects of nature might suggest a committee, so a whole team of designers might be necessary. And nothing in this world, however well “created”, is perfect. Everything seems to be flawed in one or another way, and would it not be logical to draw the conclusion that the maker himself is flawed, or non-omnipotent? There is bad in this world, and this too, might give us serious doubts of the morals of the maker.

o   And of course, if we admit that there is a designer behind the watch of the universe, there are no compelling reason what-so-ever to indicate that he is still around / alive.

39, The Cosmological Argument (the first and uncaused cause)

- Basically resumed as thus: - Why is there anything? – God.
- While it is appealingly simple, and easy to just accept, it presents several flaws or weaknesses:

o   The argument is by analogy. Everything we know is a result of causality, cause and effect, so we naturally assume that the universe too must have a cause. But the argument extends the reasoning to something that is by definition outside of our experience, our universe: to whatever created the universe. But our experience of this (world) cannot tell us anything about this, and is thus not even coherent. The universe means everything that exist, and its beginning also marks the beginning of time

o   If the universe itself is caused by something, so does also God. If not, God must be outside of “everything”, he must be supernatural. This might be satisfactory to those who already believe the conclusion that the argument is supposed to lead to. For others, it only fuels the suspicion that the argument is incoherent or unintelligible.

o   The argument resides on the notion that infinite regression is intolerable (if B causes A, than C must have caused B, and D must have caused...): the chain must end somewhere, and that that somewhere is God who is uncaused or self-caused. But is the idea of an infinite chain, implying that the universe had no beginning, really any more incomprehensible than a supernatural something lying outside of it?

o   Even if the chain must end somewhere, why cannot the universe itself be uncaused or self-caused? If self-causation becomes acceptable, God becomes redundant.

o   By accepting the argument, we thus lay some very peculiar characteristics upon God: he must be self-caused or uncaused, necessarily existent, etc.. While this in itself may be hard to interpret, the argument does not prove (if it proves anything at all) that God possesses any magic properties at all, such as omnipotence, omniscience, universal benevolence, etc..

40, The Ontological Argument (the greatest imaginable being)

- Basically the idea that, we being able to imagine a being greater than anything that we can possibly conceive, is a proof itself of the existence of God. Now it is possible to conceive God as such – and an even greater one: one that exists in reality as well as in our minds. So, for this not to be contradictory, God must exist!

- Descartes has had a similar approach: We can imagine someone kind and great. But we can also imagine someone kinder and even greater, and we can go on until imagining the perfect kind- and greatness. According to Descartes, these ideas must come from somewhere, as we cannot imagine something out of our experience. Descartes conclusion is that these principals must come from God, as he is a being of eternal kind- and greatness, thus proving his existence.

- Flaws:

o   The problem is that the same type of argument can be used to “prove” the existence of non-existent things, such as centaurs and griffins. God must thus be in some way a special case. While a juicy apple is great, it is always possible to imagine a juicier one and hence greater one. God must thus be great (/ omnipotent, omniscient ad benevolent) to a degree not possible to surpass. But, unfortunately, being bestowed of such perfect qualities is in itself contradictory:

§  To be omnipotent means, amongst other things, to be able to create beings of free will. But this is contradictory with the idea of:

§  Omniscience, which means to know everything. How can it be possible to beings of free will, thus being able to act on its own, when an omniscient God would know every consequence of his actions?

§  And of course, there is the problem of evil, putting complete benevolence up to the question

o   As Kant demonstrates in his Critique of Pure Reason, to say that God exist is not to attribute the property of existence to him, but to say that there is a concept that has those properties, and the truth of something like this cannot be determined without seeing how things are in reality outside of reality. Existence is not a property, but a precondition of having properties. The ontological argument crumbles at once if existence is denied the status of predicate.

41, The Problem of Evil (why does God let bad things happen?) 

- A problem that directly arises from the qualities that are attributed to God within the Judaeo-Christian tradition:

o   God is omniscient: knows everything logically possible to know

o   God is omnipotent: is able to do anything that is logically possible to know

o   God is omnibenevolent: universal goodwill and wishes to do every good thing possible

- But, these characteristics are contradictory to each other:

o   If God is omniscient, It knows about all suffering

o   If God is omnipotent, It is able to prevent it

o   If God is omnibenevolent, It wishes to prevent all pain and suffering

- There is pain and suffering in the world, so logically, God is either ignorant, incapable or unwilling to do anything – not the idea of God most religions like to profess.
-  There are some possible defences against this argument, though denying evil itself, or limiting God's powers does not seem to be acceptable:

o   Most theists would argue that we are ultimately better off with evil in the world, or that it is possible for them to coexist without contradiction:

§  Many would argue that evil is the price we must pay for freewill, for the freedom to make our own choices:

- If there are no moral evil, how can good actions shine forth?

- True character and virtue are forged through overcoming adversity: fighting for the oppressed, opposing the tyrant, etc.

§  Though this argument might be appealing, it struggles to explain the arbitrary distribution of human suffering;

- The blameless is often the one that suffers the most

- The vicious goes unscathed

-  The last line of defence for the faithful is often “God moves in mysterious ways”, though this argument possesses little, if no, weight with the non-believer.

42, The Freewill Defence (Freedom to do wrong)

-  The daily drama and suffering suggest a God, if any, that is removed from the perfect being described in Judaeo-Christian tradition, which is either unable or unwilling to help. In other words: a God scarcely deserving of our respect, let alone our worship.

- The most common counter-argument is that God could not have given us freewill without the risk of evil: he could not have hindered moral baseness without taking away moral goodness (see The Problem of Evil). This argument possesses several weaknesses:

o   The “Freewill Defence” might explain the so-called “moral evil”, evil caused by men alone. But what about natural evil? Man is capable of inflicting enough evil on himself without the addition of natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis), viruses (HIV), haemorrhoids etc..

o   This again might be defended by the insistence on it being the work of the devil or fallen angels, but is not that to jeopardise God's Omnipotence and Omnibenevolence?

o   Otherwise, one puts the blame on the original sin, referencing God’s “just” punishment for Adam and Eve's actions in the Garden of Eden. But is not the idea of punishing us for something our great-great-great... grandfathers did a major injustice, in no way compatible with the idea of moral excellence? “How does it benefit those being judged by the actions of their (distant) forebears to be given freewill in the first place?

- Besides the obvious problem of natural evil, the Freewill Defence runs into a major philosophical difficulty with the problem of freewill itself. The defence assumes our capacity to make free choices in its fullest sense: a decision we make is not determined or caused by any factor external to us. The possibility to do otherwise is really open to us. The problem is to explain how actions can occur indeterminately without being random, and thus in a way depriving us of moral responsibility for our actions. And if the libertarian definition of freewill is unsustainable, the whole argument crumbles with it.

43, Faith and Reason (the leap of faith)

- Roughly summarised, the debate ongoing for centuries between “fideists” and rationalists can never be finished to satisfaction for both sides. The rationalists prove to their satisfaction that faith is indeed irrational, and fideists regard the arguments as irrelevant and beside the point. No common ground seems possible.

- Pascal's Wager:  If insecure, what shall we do? We have two options

o   We believe in God:

§  We are right: we win eternal bliss

§  We are wrong: we lose nothing

o   We do not believe in God:

§  We are right: We neither win or lose anything

§  We are wrong: we lose eternal bliss at best; gain eternal damnation at worst

- Pascal's wager have been criticised by many, amongst whom Voltaire. Richard Dawkins even suggests God might reward honest attempted reasoning, but punish blind or feigned faith - anything else would just be absurd, and if so, the image of God as omnibenevolent would just be quite plainly misplaced. Richard Carrier takes the argument further