Notes by editor: I've realised that this project has become much too big, so I have decided to divide “On Faith - Part II” into several parts. As it is mostly due to the immensity of my own musings upon the subject, it will take over the place as Part II, while the individual arguments treated in “On Faith - Part I,584something” will get their own posts as Part III a), b) et cetera. I believe it will also be easier on the eye, and thus mind, this way, so we all win, no?
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Can God’s existence be proven? This simple question is in fact the opposite (which makes this sentence acquire the literary stature of an ‘antithesis’). Philosophers have tried to answer this since, well, for a heck of a long time. Some believe themselves to have been more successful than others, but in the end, also their arguments have been ripped to shreds. For the pious, the bad news is that that there is no rational evidence to support the existence of God. The good news is that there is no evidence to the contrary either, though some might argue that there are rationales that might suggest, if maybe not prove, that some religions might at least be mislead. Nevertheless, I will address some of the more common arguments and try show why, at least in my opinion, though I am seconded by, among others, philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, it is irrational to have any religious view at all (pictures of my homies respectively to North-East and South-East).Before I go on, I would like to clarify what I mean by claiming religion to be irrational. Faith is by its very nature against reason, as no god’s existence can be proven. In fact, if it could, there would no longer be any need to believe in God, Jesus, or anything at all - all that would be needed was to acknowledge its existence. So much for: “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:29). In this, I fully agree with the wisdom of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialistic philosopher that I have, though I only know a little of him, acquired a lot of respect for:
“If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe.”
Pay heed to his words, for he might be one of the greatest Christian philosophers of our time.
I have often asked myself what I would acknowledge as being a reasonable principal to found one’s belief. The question might seem paradoxical - I have just argued that belief is irrational, but what I mean by reasonable is some sort of justification as to why believe. If there are none, what would then be the difference between faith and mere gullibility? What would then be the difference between believing in God and believing in UFOs? There is no rational argument for either of them; logically, there is no difference. No, whether irrational or not, belief cannot be unjustified. But from whence should such a justification come? What could act as a proper foundation? I myself am not able to believe because I personally do not have any answer to this question. Ironically, I seem to take this question more seriously than the believers themselves, and that is perhaps also why I am not one of them. Most believers, just as me a few years ago, have grown up with the influence of their religion. I sometimes find it amusing to ask believers if they would, hypothetically, have had a different belief if they had grown up with the influence of another religion, and they unanimously accept that it might be so. And that is also a great problem as I see it. If one would have believed differently by being raised under other circumstances, it all boils down to habit. Is it not an outrage towards God that all that supports your faith in it is that you are used to that belief? And if God indeed demands and encourages blind faith, then he is no better than a tyrant, and thus not worthy, almighty or not, of our subjection. The acclaimed Omnibenevolence of the Christian God, par exemple, does not seem to be worth much.
The only justification I have come to accept as a reasonable justification, to the extent that is possible in this, is adherence to the philosophy of the religion in question. I do not myself find it necessary to subscribe to Christianity to respect and agree with the values of Christ (I would be the first to sign up for that), but others might. Others do, in fact, as the argument is not by me. Otherwise, some justify their adherence by the fact that they “feel content and right” in their belief, and take that as a sign that they are on the right path. I believe it only comes from the comfort of believing in afterlife and the other advantageous quirks of religion, which I will discuss further on, but I cannot really argue against it. How do you argue against revelations and epiphanies, or whatever it is, other than trying to make them question their sanity?
In theological philosophy, there is something called “Pascal’s Wager”, so named because it was the French philosopher Blaise Pascal that first thought of it. The idea is simple. If in doubt about God’s existence, the best thing to do is just to “wager” upon its existence. If you do believe in him, and are proven wrong, you lose nothing, but if he indeed does exist, you gain eternal life and bliss. If you do not believe in him, and are proven right, you gain nothing at all, but, if we in the end are wrong, we risk eternal damnation at worst, either way loosing eternal bliss. I cannot for a second believe that any good, as opposed to evil, God would accept such cold-hearted calculations. We are asked to believe, not to go with what seems to give the best possible outcome. In fact, I am more inclined to believe that God rewards any honest attempt of reasoning, and punishes any feigned or blind faith. I fully agree with Richard Carrier’s argument against the gambit of Pascal (though I have only included the extract provided by Wikipedia, I fully recommend following the link and reading the complete version, believer or not):
I have often asked myself what I would acknowledge as being a reasonable principal to found one’s belief. The question might seem paradoxical - I have just argued that belief is irrational, but what I mean by reasonable is some sort of justification as to why believe. If there are none, what would then be the difference between faith and mere gullibility? What would then be the difference between believing in God and believing in UFOs? There is no rational argument for either of them; logically, there is no difference. No, whether irrational or not, belief cannot be unjustified. But from whence should such a justification come? What could act as a proper foundation? I myself am not able to believe because I personally do not have any answer to this question. Ironically, I seem to take this question more seriously than the believers themselves, and that is perhaps also why I am not one of them. Most believers, just as me a few years ago, have grown up with the influence of their religion. I sometimes find it amusing to ask believers if they would, hypothetically, have had a different belief if they had grown up with the influence of another religion, and they unanimously accept that it might be so. And that is also a great problem as I see it. If one would have believed differently by being raised under other circumstances, it all boils down to habit. Is it not an outrage towards God that all that supports your faith in it is that you are used to that belief? And if God indeed demands and encourages blind faith, then he is no better than a tyrant, and thus not worthy, almighty or not, of our subjection. The acclaimed Omnibenevolence of the Christian God, par exemple, does not seem to be worth much.
The only justification I have come to accept as a reasonable justification, to the extent that is possible in this, is adherence to the philosophy of the religion in question. I do not myself find it necessary to subscribe to Christianity to respect and agree with the values of Christ (I would be the first to sign up for that), but others might. Others do, in fact, as the argument is not by me. Otherwise, some justify their adherence by the fact that they “feel content and right” in their belief, and take that as a sign that they are on the right path. I believe it only comes from the comfort of believing in afterlife and the other advantageous quirks of religion, which I will discuss further on, but I cannot really argue against it. How do you argue against revelations and epiphanies, or whatever it is, other than trying to make them question their sanity?
In theological philosophy, there is something called “Pascal’s Wager”, so named because it was the French philosopher Blaise Pascal that first thought of it. The idea is simple. If in doubt about God’s existence, the best thing to do is just to “wager” upon its existence. If you do believe in him, and are proven wrong, you lose nothing, but if he indeed does exist, you gain eternal life and bliss. If you do not believe in him, and are proven right, you gain nothing at all, but, if we in the end are wrong, we risk eternal damnation at worst, either way loosing eternal bliss. I cannot for a second believe that any good, as opposed to evil, God would accept such cold-hearted calculations. We are asked to believe, not to go with what seems to give the best possible outcome. In fact, I am more inclined to believe that God rewards any honest attempt of reasoning, and punishes any feigned or blind faith. I fully agree with Richard Carrier’s argument against the gambit of Pascal (though I have only included the extract provided by Wikipedia, I fully recommend following the link and reading the complete version, believer or not):
“Suppose there is a God who is watching us and choosing which souls of the deceased to bring to heaven, and this god really does want only the morally good to populate heaven. He will probably select from only those who made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth. For all others are untrustworthy, being cognitively or morally inferior, or both. They will also be less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong. That is, if they have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong, it follows necessarily that they must have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong. Since this knowledge requires knowledge about many fundamental facts of the universe (such as whether there is a god), it follows necessarily that such people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct. Therefore, only such people can be sufficiently moral and trustworthy to deserve a place in heaven — unless God wishes to fill heaven with the morally lazy, irresponsible, or untrustworthy.”
Even though I am content by having no religious inclination, I must say that I do envy believers to some extent. I once asked a mother why she insisted on raising her children to believe in God when she knew that she was thus depriving them of a true choice in the matter. What she answered was that she wanted her children to grow up knowing that whatever they experienced, wherever they were, they would always know that there was someone(/thing) who would watch over them. She wanted to provide them with a sense of security. I cannot argue against that, nor do I want to, because it is indeed a beautiful thought. I should know: I too grew up with it. It also gives a sense of comfort, somewhat relieving the existential anxiety, to know that there is a life after death, were the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished, and were we can meet again those we have lost - to know that we will not be lost. But though I am envious of all this, though I want all this, I cannot accept that that in itself is a good enough reason to adhere to it. Humans have always feared death; it is not a good enough reason to believe in any sort of deity. And it certainly does not prove or justify anything. In fact, many sociologists argue that that is all religion is: an attempt to quell and satisfy our fears and hopes. All agree that the gods of ancient mythology, be that Greek or Norse, are the people of their time’s attempt to explain and justify natural phenomena. Thus Thor and Zeus became gods of lightning, Freyja and Aphrodite the goddesses of love and beauty, and I especially like the mythology around Eros, explaining that we fall in love by being shot by arrows. But mythology is no more than outdated and unfashionable religion, and in what way is modern religion any less “mythological”?
But we should get back to my original point. Throughout the ages, philosophers and theologists have presented different sorts of logical “proofs” of God’s, or several gods’, existence. Saint Thomas Aquinas have his argument of (in)finite regress, Descartes has his ontological argument, et cetera. Many of these have existed under several different versions throughout the ages, and, though they have all been dis-proven, they keep coming back, as many of them have a certain perennial appeal. All of the different arguments I will aboard are present in my notes from “50 Philosophical Ideas you really Need to Know”, but this time I will try to thoroughly describe and explain the ideas. I will start with the most obvious one, the one often used to justify deism (I did so myself until I read and reflected upon the chapter concerned): The Cosmological argument. Look it up in “Faith – Part III a) The Cosmological Argument”. Coming soon
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