Waiting for Faith: On the Obligations of the Royal

Editor's notes: I know this is getting ridiculous; this will be the last waiting for. I am currently working on the next "On Faith" article, which will, if not terminate the series, at least accomplish my original goal.

               It has recently been brought to my attention that the Norwegian king is actually obliged by law to be a proclaimed Christian (Lutheran). I already knew that he along with the rest of the Royal Family are the only ones not allowed to have any official political opinion, a notion I support, yet this seems particularly cruel and totalitarian. The law against any voiced political opinion, which include a conduct which does not suggest partiality, is necessary to keep the Royals above political meddling. I will not discuss why I, and Norway as well, deem that necessary. This, however, is as said, only laws concerning conduct. The king can, of course think whatever he likes, as law cannot limit thought. But is this not exactly what it is doing with a law obliging Christian adherence? The ones that made me aware of this law states that as the king represents Norway, a Christian country with Christian traditions, it is only natural that he himself is Christian. They also point to that is is in no way forced to any religion. He adhere to whatever religion he likes, but only if he abdicates the throne. But in what way is that a real choice? But I do not mean do digress to far away from my main point. Even considering that the king is a representative for a Christian Norway, I do not believe that any law should be able to force a certain philosophical or religious opinion on anyone. One might argue that he only has to be Lutheran officially, but I will not myself defend such a preposterous and blasphemous notion.
               I feel the need to specify that I am of course not against having a Christian king,  nor a Muslim one for that matter, only against any law obliging adherence. No one's mind should be subjected to law, not even the king's. As an analogy, racism is not outlawed - only acting upon it is.


"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief" extract from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18

Waiting for Faith: A Propos Pascal's Wager

          When I was searching for a diagram to illustrate Pascal's Wager, a lot of unexpected, and most welcome! results turned up. I enjoyed myself a lot and would like to share that (some of the pictures are small, so just click on them to get a better view). With my two or three readers......... Sources will be given in the post scriptum.

I do like this one, though it does not really capture the essence of my critique of the Wager. As I've already said, I do not believe that God rewards cynical faith-based calculations. And which God should one gamble on anyway? Which brings us to the next one:

As the lady says, something Blaise (Pascal) overlooked, how to know which God to gamble on? There are literally thousands of different religious views out there, so how does one now which one is correct? Christianity wasn't even the first major religion; one might as well believe in Greek or Norse mythology (or in the Flying Spaghetti Monster! though that one is contemporary)! I do love the way Richard Dawkins arguments. But now, let's look at some motivational posters:

Whomever made the one to the left, and for that matter the one to the right, is right (and hello confusing sentence!): It is inspiring! Oh! and I love the way I can now reread some cartoons and understanding the pretty deep and smart reference to the Gambit. Calvin and Hobbes, and XKCD ftW(!):

I also found some that might seem a bit offensive to Christians (and atheists, for that matter). I will let the curious search out the most offensive for themselves, though I do believe these two seem innocent enough:

And then a little bit of good-old criticism of bigotry:

And I simply adore this one ("Publie, je ne le hais point!"):

Myth busted! I will terminate this article with what I believe is what Pascal's Wager should have been, if Blaise had been better versed in religious views. It is really brilliantly thought of, and though it is amusing, it should also be lauded for its verity. I realise now that I should have included this in my previous article:

Ps. My sources cited chronologically:

1. http://www.freethoughtpedia.com/wiki/Pascal's_Wager
2. http://www.whydontyou.org.uk/blog/2008/09/25/pascals-wager-in-cartoon-terms/
3. http://thethinkable.com/home.php/2009/01/27/gambling-with-god
4. http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/okay-athiest-wouldnt-you-rather-live-a-good-life-doing-what-god-says-to-do-and-believe-in-him-and/question-535535/?page=4
5. http://unreasonablefaith.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/ch090204.gif
6. http://xkcd.com/525/
7. http://www.smbc-comics.com/
8. http://fleasnobbery.blogspot.com/2009/02/pascals-wager.html
9. http://www.thadguy.com/comic/godless-atheists/251/
10. http://abstrusegoose.com/258
11.  http://thechaoscosmos.com/

On Faith - Part II: On the Path from Deism to Agnosticism

Notes by editor: I've realised that this project has become much too big, so I have decided to divide “On Faith - Part II” into several parts. As it is mostly due to the immensity of my own musings upon the subject, it will take over the place as Part II, while the individual arguments treated in “On Faith - Part I,584something” will get their own posts as Part III a), b) et cetera. I believe it will also be easier on the eye, and thus mind, this way, so we all win, no?

            Can God’s existence be proven? This simple question is in fact the opposite (which makes this sentence acquire the literary stature of an ‘antithesis’). Philosophers have tried to answer this since, well, for a heck of a long time. Some believe themselves to have been more successful than others, but in the end, also their arguments have been ripped to shreds. For the pious, the bad news is that that there is no rational evidence to support the existence of God. The good news is that there is no evidence to the contrary either, though some might argue that there are rationales that might suggest, if maybe not prove, that some religions might at least be mislead. Nevertheless, I will address some of the more common arguments and try show why, at least in my opinion, though I am seconded by, among others, philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, it is irrational to have any religious view at all (pictures of my homies respectively to North-East and South-East).

Before I go on, I would like to clarify what I mean by claiming religion to be irrational. Faith is by its very nature against reason, as no god’s existence can be proven. In fact, if it could, there would no longer be any need to believe in God, Jesus, or anything at all - all that would be needed was to acknowledge its existence. So much for: “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:29). In this, I fully agree with the wisdom of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialistic philosopher that I have, though I only know a little of him, acquired a lot of respect for:

“If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe.”

Pay heed to his words, for he might be one of the greatest Christian philosophers of our time. 
I have often asked myself what I would acknowledge as being a reasonable principal to found one’s belief. The question might seem paradoxical - I have just argued that belief is irrational, but what I mean by reasonable is some sort of justification as to why believe. If there are none, what would then be the difference between faith and mere gullibility? What would then be the difference between believing in God and believing in UFOs? There is no rational argument for either of them; logically, there is no difference. No, whether irrational or not, belief cannot be unjustified. But from whence should such a justification come? What could act as a proper foundation? I myself am not able to believe because I personally do not have any answer to this question. Ironically, I seem to take this question more seriously than the believers themselves, and that is perhaps also why I am not one of them. Most believers, just as me a few years ago, have grown up with the influence of their religion. I sometimes find it amusing to ask believers if they would, hypothetically, have had a different belief if they had grown up with the influence of another religion, and they unanimously accept that it might be so. And that is also a great problem as I see it. If one would have believed differently by being raised under other circumstances, it all boils down to habit. Is it not an outrage towards God that all that supports your faith in it is that you are used to that belief? And if God indeed demands and encourages blind faith, then he is no better than a tyrant, and thus not worthy, almighty or not, of our subjection. The acclaimed Omnibenevolence of the Christian God, par exemple, does not seem to be worth much.
                The only justification I have come to accept as a reasonable justification, to the extent that is possible in this, is adherence to the philosophy of the religion in question. I do not myself find it necessary to subscribe to Christianity to respect and agree with the values of Christ (I would be the first to sign up for that), but others might. Others do, in fact, as the argument is not by me. Otherwise, some justify their adherence by the fact that they “feel content and right” in their belief, and take that as a sign that they are on the right path. I believe it only comes from the comfort of believing in afterlife and the other advantageous quirks of religion, which I will discuss further on, but I cannot really argue against it. How do you argue against revelations and epiphanies, or whatever it is, other than trying to make them question their sanity?
                In theological philosophy, there is something called “Pascal’s Wager”, so named because it was the French philosopher Blaise Pascal that first thought of it. The idea is simple. If in doubt about God’s existence, the best thing to do is just to “wager” upon its existence. If you do believe in him, and are proven wrong, you lose nothing, but if he indeed does exist, you gain eternal life and bliss. If you do not believe in him, and are proven right, you gain nothing at all, but, if we in the end are wrong, we risk eternal damnation at worst, either way loosing eternal bliss. I cannot for a second believe that any good, as opposed to evil, God would accept such cold-hearted calculations. We are asked to believe, not to go with what seems to give the best possible outcome. In fact, I am more inclined to believe that God rewards any honest attempt of reasoning, and punishes any feigned or blind faith. I fully agree with Richard Carrier’s argument  against the gambit of Pascal (though I have only included the extract provided by Wikipedia, I fully recommend following the link and reading the complete version, believer or not):

“Suppose there is a God who is watching us and choosing which souls of the deceased to bring to heaven, and this god really does want only the morally good to populate heaven. He will probably select from only those who made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth. For all others are untrustworthy, being cognitively or morally inferior, or both. They will also be less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong. That is, if they have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong, it follows necessarily that they must have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong. Since this knowledge requires knowledge about many fundamental facts of the universe (such as whether there is a god), it follows necessarily that such people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct. Therefore, only such people can be sufficiently moral and trustworthy to deserve a place in heaven — unless God wishes to fill heaven with the morally lazy, irresponsible, or untrustworthy.”

Even though I am content by having no religious inclination, I must say that I do envy believers to some extent. I once asked a mother why she insisted on raising her children to believe in God when she knew that she was thus depriving them of a true choice in the matter. What she answered was that she wanted her children to grow up knowing that whatever they experienced, wherever they were, they would always know that there was someone(/thing) who would watch over them. She wanted to provide them with a sense of security. I cannot argue against that, nor do I want to, because it is indeed a beautiful thought. I should know: I too grew up with it. It also gives a sense of comfort, somewhat relieving the existential anxiety, to know that there is a life after death, were the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished, and were we can meet again those we have lost - to know that we will not be lost. But though I am envious of all this, though I want all this, I cannot accept that that in itself is a good enough reason to adhere to it. Humans have always feared death; it is not a good enough reason to believe in any sort of deity. And it certainly does not prove or justify anything. In fact, many sociologists argue that that is all religion is: an attempt to quell and satisfy our fears and hopes. All agree that the gods of ancient mythology, be that Greek or Norse, are the people of their time’s attempt to explain and justify natural phenomena. Thus Thor and Zeus became gods of lightning, Freyja and Aphrodite the goddesses of love and beauty, and I especially like the mythology around Eros, explaining that we fall in love by being shot by arrows. But mythology is no more than outdated and unfashionable religion, and in what way is modern religion any less “mythological”?

But we should get back to my original point. Throughout the ages, philosophers and theologists have presented different sorts of logical “proofs” of God’s, or several gods’, existence. Saint Thomas Aquinas have his argument of (in)finite regress, Descartes has his ontological argument, et cetera. Many of these have existed under several different versions throughout the ages, and, though they have all been dis-proven, they keep coming back, as many of them have a certain perennial appeal. All of the different arguments I will aboard are present in my notes from “50 Philosophical Ideas you really Need to Know”, but this time I will try to thoroughly describe and explain the ideas. I will start with the most obvious one, the one often used to justify deism (I did so myself until I read and reflected upon the chapter concerned): The Cosmological argument. Look it up in “Faith – Part III a) The Cosmological Argument”. Coming soon

“If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation, that He exists”, Blaise Pascal

Waiting for Faith: On Arpeggios

          I never thought I would post something where I'd excuse myself for not posting more often - so I won't. I do, however, feel the need to explain that, though I try to write something every two weeks, there has been a hiatus due to the fact that the PC on which I wrote the draft for "Faith - Part II" went 'bye-bye'. I have not been able to access it for around two weeks, but I can now, so the next post will be published in a few days.

          While I have your attention, I feel the need to remark that, as a pianist, I really abhor arpeggios. They sound nice, but they are really difficult to master, and they are everywhere. They exist in a million variations too, so one has to learn them all over. Every. Single. Time. I thought I had had the worst of it, but that was until I decide to partake "Lugia's Song", a really beautiful piece from the second Pokémon movie. They seem simple enough, but they are divinely awful to play.
          I might exaggerate, but I do not like, to learn, arpeggios. I will master these too eventually, but in the meantime, they are my worst enemy.

On Faith - Part I,584something

         As a preparation for my oncoming article "On Faith - Part II", I have decided to post my notes on the chapters concerning religion from an amazing book I just read. For a very good résumé of the panorama of ideas that make up western philosophy, "50 Philosophy Ideas You really Need to Know" is the book to look for. In the chapters concerned, the authors introduce and explain the different philosophical arguments meant to prove God's existence, for then to explain end interpret the responses and counter-arguments of philosophers. To sum up concisely, God's existence can neither be proven nor dis-proven. To sum up not quite as quickly, my notes concerning these chapters, plus some of my own additions, can be found further down:

Religion

38, The Argument from Design (the divine watchmaker) 

- The argument form design, also known as the theological argument, is the belief that we can induce from the complexity of natural mechanisms that there is a creator behind it all. But there are several weak points in this theory, first pointed out by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779):

o   Arguments from analogy works best when the different ‘objects’ are not too different. We can infer from our anatomical resemblance with the chimpanzees that they might feel pain as we do, but to compare an eye with a camera is to go a bit far, as is to compare a watch with the mechanisms of the universe

o   The argument is vulnerable to infinite regress. If our universe needs a designer, than what can we say about the universe and its designer? Do we need and über-designer? And then an über-über-designer, etc.?

o   The arguments biggest appeal is that it explains the complexity and marvel with what things like the human eye works and comes to existence. But the theory of evolution does the same thing, without the need of an omnipotent creator.

o   Even if we recognise in the argument, there are limits to it. Certain aspects of nature might suggest a committee, so a whole team of designers might be necessary. And nothing in this world, however well “created”, is perfect. Everything seems to be flawed in one or another way, and would it not be logical to draw the conclusion that the maker himself is flawed, or non-omnipotent? There is bad in this world, and this too, might give us serious doubts of the morals of the maker.

o   And of course, if we admit that there is a designer behind the watch of the universe, there are no compelling reason what-so-ever to indicate that he is still around / alive.

39, The Cosmological Argument (the first and uncaused cause)

- Basically resumed as thus: - Why is there anything? – God.
- While it is appealingly simple, and easy to just accept, it presents several flaws or weaknesses:

o   The argument is by analogy. Everything we know is a result of causality, cause and effect, so we naturally assume that the universe too must have a cause. But the argument extends the reasoning to something that is by definition outside of our experience, our universe: to whatever created the universe. But our experience of this (world) cannot tell us anything about this, and is thus not even coherent. The universe means everything that exist, and its beginning also marks the beginning of time

o   If the universe itself is caused by something, so does also God. If not, God must be outside of “everything”, he must be supernatural. This might be satisfactory to those who already believe the conclusion that the argument is supposed to lead to. For others, it only fuels the suspicion that the argument is incoherent or unintelligible.

o   The argument resides on the notion that infinite regression is intolerable (if B causes A, than C must have caused B, and D must have caused...): the chain must end somewhere, and that that somewhere is God who is uncaused or self-caused. But is the idea of an infinite chain, implying that the universe had no beginning, really any more incomprehensible than a supernatural something lying outside of it?

o   Even if the chain must end somewhere, why cannot the universe itself be uncaused or self-caused? If self-causation becomes acceptable, God becomes redundant.

o   By accepting the argument, we thus lay some very peculiar characteristics upon God: he must be self-caused or uncaused, necessarily existent, etc.. While this in itself may be hard to interpret, the argument does not prove (if it proves anything at all) that God possesses any magic properties at all, such as omnipotence, omniscience, universal benevolence, etc..

40, The Ontological Argument (the greatest imaginable being)

- Basically the idea that, we being able to imagine a being greater than anything that we can possibly conceive, is a proof itself of the existence of God. Now it is possible to conceive God as such – and an even greater one: one that exists in reality as well as in our minds. So, for this not to be contradictory, God must exist!

- Descartes has had a similar approach: We can imagine someone kind and great. But we can also imagine someone kinder and even greater, and we can go on until imagining the perfect kind- and greatness. According to Descartes, these ideas must come from somewhere, as we cannot imagine something out of our experience. Descartes conclusion is that these principals must come from God, as he is a being of eternal kind- and greatness, thus proving his existence.

- Flaws:

o   The problem is that the same type of argument can be used to “prove” the existence of non-existent things, such as centaurs and griffins. God must thus be in some way a special case. While a juicy apple is great, it is always possible to imagine a juicier one and hence greater one. God must thus be great (/ omnipotent, omniscient ad benevolent) to a degree not possible to surpass. But, unfortunately, being bestowed of such perfect qualities is in itself contradictory:

§  To be omnipotent means, amongst other things, to be able to create beings of free will. But this is contradictory with the idea of:

§  Omniscience, which means to know everything. How can it be possible to beings of free will, thus being able to act on its own, when an omniscient God would know every consequence of his actions?

§  And of course, there is the problem of evil, putting complete benevolence up to the question

o   As Kant demonstrates in his Critique of Pure Reason, to say that God exist is not to attribute the property of existence to him, but to say that there is a concept that has those properties, and the truth of something like this cannot be determined without seeing how things are in reality outside of reality. Existence is not a property, but a precondition of having properties. The ontological argument crumbles at once if existence is denied the status of predicate.

41, The Problem of Evil (why does God let bad things happen?) 

- A problem that directly arises from the qualities that are attributed to God within the Judaeo-Christian tradition:

o   God is omniscient: knows everything logically possible to know

o   God is omnipotent: is able to do anything that is logically possible to know

o   God is omnibenevolent: universal goodwill and wishes to do every good thing possible

- But, these characteristics are contradictory to each other:

o   If God is omniscient, It knows about all suffering

o   If God is omnipotent, It is able to prevent it

o   If God is omnibenevolent, It wishes to prevent all pain and suffering

- There is pain and suffering in the world, so logically, God is either ignorant, incapable or unwilling to do anything – not the idea of God most religions like to profess.
-  There are some possible defences against this argument, though denying evil itself, or limiting God's powers does not seem to be acceptable:

o   Most theists would argue that we are ultimately better off with evil in the world, or that it is possible for them to coexist without contradiction:

§  Many would argue that evil is the price we must pay for freewill, for the freedom to make our own choices:

- If there are no moral evil, how can good actions shine forth?

- True character and virtue are forged through overcoming adversity: fighting for the oppressed, opposing the tyrant, etc.

§  Though this argument might be appealing, it struggles to explain the arbitrary distribution of human suffering;

- The blameless is often the one that suffers the most

- The vicious goes unscathed

-  The last line of defence for the faithful is often “God moves in mysterious ways”, though this argument possesses little, if no, weight with the non-believer.

42, The Freewill Defence (Freedom to do wrong)

-  The daily drama and suffering suggest a God, if any, that is removed from the perfect being described in Judaeo-Christian tradition, which is either unable or unwilling to help. In other words: a God scarcely deserving of our respect, let alone our worship.

- The most common counter-argument is that God could not have given us freewill without the risk of evil: he could not have hindered moral baseness without taking away moral goodness (see The Problem of Evil). This argument possesses several weaknesses:

o   The “Freewill Defence” might explain the so-called “moral evil”, evil caused by men alone. But what about natural evil? Man is capable of inflicting enough evil on himself without the addition of natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis), viruses (HIV), haemorrhoids etc..

o   This again might be defended by the insistence on it being the work of the devil or fallen angels, but is not that to jeopardise God's Omnipotence and Omnibenevolence?

o   Otherwise, one puts the blame on the original sin, referencing God’s “just” punishment for Adam and Eve's actions in the Garden of Eden. But is not the idea of punishing us for something our great-great-great... grandfathers did a major injustice, in no way compatible with the idea of moral excellence? “How does it benefit those being judged by the actions of their (distant) forebears to be given freewill in the first place?

- Besides the obvious problem of natural evil, the Freewill Defence runs into a major philosophical difficulty with the problem of freewill itself. The defence assumes our capacity to make free choices in its fullest sense: a decision we make is not determined or caused by any factor external to us. The possibility to do otherwise is really open to us. The problem is to explain how actions can occur indeterminately without being random, and thus in a way depriving us of moral responsibility for our actions. And if the libertarian definition of freewill is unsustainable, the whole argument crumbles with it.

43, Faith and Reason (the leap of faith)

- Roughly summarised, the debate ongoing for centuries between “fideists” and rationalists can never be finished to satisfaction for both sides. The rationalists prove to their satisfaction that faith is indeed irrational, and fideists regard the arguments as irrelevant and beside the point. No common ground seems possible.

- Pascal's Wager:  If insecure, what shall we do? We have two options

o   We believe in God:

§  We are right: we win eternal bliss

§  We are wrong: we lose nothing

o   We do not believe in God:

§  We are right: We neither win or lose anything

§  We are wrong: we lose eternal bliss at best; gain eternal damnation at worst

- Pascal's wager have been criticised by many, amongst whom Voltaire. Richard Dawkins even suggests God might reward honest attempted reasoning, but punish blind or feigned faith - anything else would just be absurd, and if so, the image of God as omnibenevolent would just be quite plainly misplaced. Richard Carrier takes the argument further

On Faith - Part I: Theism Vs. Deism

                One of the subjects on which I have thought the most lately is faith, or rather it's foundations. I, myself, grew up in a region in Norway that is a part of what we call the Bible belt, which is made up by the most “Christian” regions, stretching from the south and following the coast north-east. I thus grew up in a Christian dominated community, and, naturally, I integrated Christianity into my life's philosophy. I have always had an open mind, always being ready to listen to and even adopt alien philosophies (ways to look at life), but when it came to religion, I was never able to do the same – for lack of trying. Not that I was not curious or interested, but it was unthinkable, by the denotation of the word, to  consider the values of other religions - as is the habit of virtually every religious faith. With hindsight, the only way not to waver in faith is to have a rather condescending approach to other religions, or agnosticism and atheism, for that matter. I was no exception.
                 But as adamant as I was, I now find myself having become an agnostic, by the intermediary of a deist, so something must have changed. In this first part, I will speak of how I went for Lutheranism, which was my former Christian sect, to deism.

 After having finished my primary education, I went to France to pursue the secondary, and it was there, mainly thanks to my literature teacher during the second year, that I made myself familiar with the philosophers of the Enlightenment, and I must say I felt inclined to their way of looking at religion. Rapidly summed up, they adhered to what is called deism, which is the belief in a god, or a divine entity as I prefer, as the creator of the world. A grand architect, as I believe the Freemasons have called it. One might ask where the difference in that with for example Christianity is, but it is fundamentally different by the fact that it doesn't really go any further. Monotheism, as my teacher explained it, is the belief in a (one) God, has declared himself (or itself), and that can be represented. The old man with the long white beard in the roof of the Sistine Chapel is an example of how Catholicism corresponds with the latter. Theism is the belief in a god that has declared himself, but that has its own nature – one that man cannot fathom. Islam is a good example of this, as it is seen as blasphemous even to try to imagine what he might look like (I find it interesting that they still refer to him as him). Deism, on the other hand is the belief in a divine entity as a creator, but that has not, in any way, made himself known. It is no more than a logical assumption, as in the words of Voltaire:

“I cannot imagine how the clockwork of the universe can exist without a clockmaker.”

As to the fact that he hasn't bothered to say hi, I will again quote Voltaire, this time in the words of a dervish from “Candide”:

“What does it matter,” said the dervish, “whether there is evil or good? When His Highness sends a ship to Egypt does he trouble himself whether the rats in the vessel are at their ease or not?”

It seems to me that it is a completely pretentious and, not in the least, egocentric thought to believe that God, whether it exists or not, occupies itself with us mere humans when there is a vastness of infinite space, and possibly many other worlds, in the universe.
                The words of Voltaire appealed to me, as, though I had always been a Christian out of obviousness, I have never really identified myself with Christianity's religious philosophy. What finally made me agree and adhere to deism were the words of, yet another time, Voltaire, put in the mouth of the eponymous personage of “L'Ingénu” (this is my own translation, as I could not find one for free: thou be’st warned):

“If there was one mere truth hidden in the heap of arguments that we have dwelled upon for all these centuries, we would have found it without doubt; and the universe would have at least agreed upon that. If this truth was necessary as the Sun is to the Earth, it would have shone as brilliantly as it. It is an absurdity, it is an outrage to the human race; it is an onset upon the Infinite and Supreme Being to say: There is an essential truth to Man, and God has hidden it.”

This in itself was not enough to make me change my religious philosophy, but it had already been weakened by a couple of questions that had arisen to my attention. During the same year, I read “Holy Blood, Holy grail”. One may refute their conclusions, but it is not the hypothesis the authors propose that made me think, but a number of observations they made, particularly about the Bible. 

            There seems to be a certain partiality to the Romans, which is far from justified. One of the first clues to this is the case of Pontius Pilate. He is portrayed as a rather kind leader, with whom one could sympathise. He did after all give the people of Jerusalem a chance to save Jesus, which they chose to ignore, by appealing to an Easter tradition of liberating a prisoner. First of all, historians have never found any evidence of such a tradition – the Bible is the only source, and historically, Pilate has never been known for being anything else than a tyrant; a corrupt politician taking bribes and misusing his power, even worsening the tyrannical pressure from Rome. It thus seems logical to assume that his portrayal in the Bible is unrealistic; even false. I would also like to add that the political situation in Judea, the lower administrative part of Palestine in the time of Christ, was an incredible tense and unstable one. The Roman government was a brutal and absolute one. When the Romans occupied Judea to take direct control, they executed 3'000 rebels without any form of judgement. A period of revolt and extreme political tension marked the coming of Christ, and it continued for another hundred years afterwards, culminating in the expulsion of all Jews in Judea by decree of Emperor Hadrian in 135 A.D.. The strange thing is that none of the Gospels give any impression or hint of this – it is even suggested that it was a time of peace, and that most citizens were content with the situation. The interpretation of the authors, which I support, is that all this has been done, wittingly or not, to shift the blame for the death of Christ away from the Romans – the Gospels were mostly written by Romans and for Romans after all (with the possible exception of the Gospels According to Matthew). I also wish to add that all “the other” early Christian texts, for Christianity had already divided itself into different “branches”, some believing Christ to be the son of God, others just a prophet, others again a mixture of both, have been severely repressed, so that there are no (present) rival interpretation of the religion. Christianity, which was to be the national religion of Rome by the decree of Emperor Constantine, would have seemed slightly less appealing to its people if they were blamed for the death of their saviour. It was thus much more ... strategic... to blame the Jews, who have been persecuted as “murderers of Christ” even in our time. Now, all this might seem a bit far-fetched, but there are other indications (I do not dare, nor think it is completely justified, to speak of proof, but then again, can one consider the Gospels, at all, to be accurate?). I already mentioned that the Bible has a rather kind portrayal of Pontius Pilate, who only reluctantly adheres to the crucifixion of Jesus. Jesus was, according to the Gospels preliminarily judged by the ‘Sanhedrin’, a council of 71 priests and scholars that functioned as the highest institution of Jewish law. In the synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark and Luke), Jesus was arrested the night before Good Friday. But this makes little sense, because the laws of the Jewish council forbade them to gather during Passover, even during the night. Also, if he had been judged by the Jews for blasphemy, why would they not have chosen stoning as the execution method? Apparently, they had the legal authority to give a death sentence, by stoning, so why they needed to bother Pilate at all seems strange. Crucifixion was besides a roman method of execution, reserved mainly (though not exclusively) for political prisoners – enemies of Rome. To sum up in the words of the authors of “Holy Blood, holy Grail”: “(...) Jesus was a victim of a Roman administration, Roman law, Roman judgement, Roman military power and a Roman Execution. Jesus was not crucified for crimes against Judaism, but for crimes against the Empire”. 
                There is other evidence that supports the idea of a more political figure than religious. At the time, there was a Jewish political, and, I am tempted to say, terrorist movement, the Zealots, that held significant support amongst the Jewish people, as they were bent on throwing the Romans out of Judea. At least one of his twelve disciples, Simon, was a Zealot, and several others; such as James, John, and Judas; at least sympathised with Zealot agenda, if they were not directly involved. Also, the term ‘Messiah’, of which ‘Christos’ is the Greek translation, simply means “the anointed one” and usually pertains a King. At the time of Jesus, the Messiah was meant to be a legitimate king, an unknown descendant from the kin of David, who was supposed to free his people from Roman oppression. The expectation of such a (war)leader attained around this time a proportion of unrest that developed into hysteria, and this continued even after the Death of Jesus. The rebellion in 66 A.D. that ended with the Romans sacking Jerusalem was caused by the Zealots stirring up the unrest with the pretext of the coming of the Messiah. Today, the expression signifies a divine saviour, but at the time, the addition of divine would have been seen upon as preposterous, even ridiculous. It was a politically charged title that was given to Jesus, and he became known as ‘Jesus Messiah” or ‘Jesus Christos’ in Greek, a, again, title that later was corrupted into a proper name, ‘Jesus Christ’. Historians are fairly certain that Jesus has existed, but the historical Jesus might not live completely up to the divine image he has been given posthumously.

               The problem with the Bible is that it is not accurate enough, nor impartial. It even contradicts itself recurrently. It is said that whatever point of view that one might be defending, you will be able to find something in the Bible that supports your theory. The Bible is used to defend women's rights in the Church - the right to take part of its higher hierarchy, and it is used to subjugate them (“Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn any thing, let them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church”. I Corinthians 14:34-35, the New Testament). My favourite example is from Leviticus 24: 19-21, in the Old Testament: “¹⁹Anyone who maims another shall suffer the same injury in return: ²⁰fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; the injury inflicted is the injury to be suffered. ²¹One who kills an animal shall make restitution for it; but one who kills a human being shall be put to death”. But my focus is on the New Testament, and its partiality towards Romans and possible inaccuracy, even falsification. The Bible might be said not to be written by God, but inspired, though one would think that divine inspiration might not make such manipulative texts, and so many different versions of them (again, the Gospels we know were chosen between many others). But even by ignoring all that, in the end, I just do not feel that I can trust a document that has been handed down from generation to generation for 2’000 years. When we can't seem to find out who or what really killed John F. Kennedy, a mere fifty years ago, how the heck can we ever be sure of what really happened or did not happen over two millennia back in time? I just do not trust humanity enough to take our forefathers' (apparent) word for God's existence and interest. And when I cannot trust the Bible, the very founding stone of Christianity, how can I trust Christianity itself? I did believe that there is a god, or a divine entity - I could not see any other logical solution to the cosmological problem (the universe's very existence), but it did not have to be the Christian god. Deism was just more appealing.


"The more I study religions the more I am convinced that Man has never worshipped anything but himself", Richard Burton